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ABSTRACT
This study examines the simultaneous role played by economic freedom 
and democracy in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. In 
order to investigate this relation, data from a sample of 87countries over 
the period of 1981-2010 is employed. The main finding shows that the 
influence of economic freedom on FDI inflows is positive and significant. 
However, the results suggest that the democracy has no significant role in 
attracting FDI. The findings indicate that there is no evidence to support 
the idea that simultaneous occurrence of economic freedom and democracy 
are required to attract MNEs presence. Instead, the results reveal that 
improvement in economic freedom alone is sufficient to attract more 
FDI inflows. This finding is not consistent with Friedman’s view that free 
markets and political freedom are inseparable. Obviously, MNEs respond 
only to improvement in freedom of economic activity but not the level 
of democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
There are several reasons to believe why economic freedom acts as an important pre-condition 
for attracting FDI inflows. It could be expected that domestic investment climate in FDI 
recipient countries affect a foreign investor's decision to send the FDI in a country (Quazi, 
2007). Moreover, in an ideal free economy, individuals are free to invest in any way they wish; 
to move their labor, goods, and capital; and to 
gain much freedom to manage their business. 
In that economy, MNEs have more freedom to 
import desired materials, equipment, capital, 
Int. Journal of Economics and Management 11(1): 1 – 15 (2017)
2
or even the labor; and export their production. Thus, it is expected that the MNEs enjoy and 
benefit more where the economic freedom is higher. 
This study argues that economic freedom alone is not sufficient to guarantee sustained 
flows of FDI. In order to sustain MNEs presence in the long run, economic freedom should be 
complemented with a good quality of democracy. In other words, this study hypothesizes that 
simultaneous occurrence of both economic freedom and democracy is important in attracting 
FDI inflows. Friedman (1962) suggests that free markets and political freedom are inseparable. 
1“It is widely believed that politics and economics are separate and largely unconnected such 
that individual freedom is a political problem and material welfare is an economic problem”. 
Friedman (1962) believes that the economic freedom is an “indispensable means toward 
the achievement of political freedom”. He called such beliefs as “a delusion” and promotes 
economic freedom as both essential freedom in itself and a very important means for political 
freedom. He argues that ‘‘the relationship between political freedom and economic freedom 
is complex and by no means unilateral” (pp. 7–10).
There are several reasons to believe that why the simultaneous existence of both political 
and economic freedom is important to guarantee continuous and sustained inflows of FDI. 
Firstly, “property rights” is a fundamental part of economic freedom. With protected property 
rights, people have more freedom to decide whether make use of their property, earn from it, or 
transfer it to anyone else. In addition, a good protection for property rights decreases uncertainty 
and encourages investments. As a result, a country with a secured system of property rights are 
more able to absorb FDI inflows (Siegan, 1997; Weimer, 1997). It has been widely accepted 
that MNEs are more willing to invest in country with a good protection of property rights 
(Mathur & Singh, 2013). However, it should be emphasized that protection of property right 
may not be sustained in undemocratic society. Clague et al. (1996) suggest that, in general, 
democracies grant greater protection of property rights than autocracies. Moreover, Friedman 
(1999) views property rights as “the most basic of human rights and an essential foundation 
for other human rights” (Friedman & Friedman, 1999: P.605). In other words, the protecting 
of property rights cannot be sustained without democracy. 
Secondly, level of corruption is highly correlated with the level of economic freedom and 
empirical evidence show that less corrupt countries receive more FDI flows. It is expected 
that economies that are more corrupted have less capability to offer the right kind of economic 
climate for MNEs, such as personal property protection, the right to move capital in and out 
of the country, or the capacity of trade openness in the world markets. Accordingly, more 
corrupted economies get less FDI flows (Mathur & Singh, 2013). Moreover, higher level of 
democracy has a discouraging effect on corruption (Emerson, 2006) via its role in reducing 
rent seeking activities due to its system of checks and balances (Rodrik, 2000). According to 
this view, democracy is needed in ensuring low level of corruption. 
Accordingly, this study investigates the simultaneous influence of economic freedom and 
democracy on FDI inflows. The specific objective of this study is to evaluate the simultaneous 
effects of economic freedom and democracy on FDI inflows. This study extends the literature 
1 The terms of “democracy” and “political freedom” are used interchangeably. Democracy is a form of government in 
which all people get an equivalent say in making the decisions that influence their lives; and the Political freedom is a 
central concept/the most important features of democratic societies (Arendt, 1993).
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by investigating the simultaneous role of economic freedom and democracy in attracting FDI 
inflows. In the past, empirical studies have mainly focus on their impacts independently. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Several studies uncover the factors that may affect FDI inflows. Human capital, market size, 
infrastructure, trade openness, institutional quality, political and economic conditions are 
among important determinants of FDI (see for example, Noorbakhsh et al., 2001; Tun et al., 
2012, among others). However, the literature on the impact of economic freedom on FDI is 
limited. Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003), Quazi (2007), and Azman-Saini et al. (2013) 
focus on economic freedom as the primary determinant for FDI inflows in Latin America, Asian 
countries, and a sample of 75 countries, respectively, Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003), 
using fixed effect panel data for a sample of 18 Latin American countries, find that economic 
freedom is a positive determinant of FDI inflows and that FDI positively effects economic 
growth in the host countries. Quazi (2007) employs a simple panel regression for a sample of 
seven East Asian countries over the 1995–2000 periods and finds that economic freedom, as 
a proxy for the “domestic investment climate,” is a significant and robust determinant of FDI. 
More recently, Azman-Saini et al. (2013) examine the role of economic freedom in attracting 
FDI inflows for 75 countries over the period of 1981 to 2005. They show that the positive 
impact of economic freedom on MNEs locational decisions to send FDI to a particular country 
is indisputable. They illustrate that higher economic freedom causes a more enabling business 
environment. The following two reasons are specified in their paper to believe why economic 
freedom is essential in attracting FDI. Firstly, to decrease transaction or production costs, the 
MNEs prefer less regulated economies, due to the high costs of doing business. Secondly, 
the MNEs send their investments to more free economies, because a high level of economic 
freedom guarantees them better legal protection of their assets.
In meanwhile, there are two opposing views on the impact of democracy on FDI inflows. 
One approach suggests a negative relationship between democracy and FDI.  According to this 
approach, FDI harms democracy and decreases FDI spillover effects. Jessup (1999) indicates 
that MNEs choose autocratic regimes because of their lower executive constraints. Oneal 
(1994) suggests that a dictatorial regime’s economy provides more returns than a democratic 
regime’s economy in developing nations. A few empirical studies support the theoretical 
foundation for the negative impact of democracy on FDI. There are also some papers which 
report no significant impact of democracy on FDI. For example, Singh and Jun (1995) report 
that the influence of the Freedom House political rights index on FDI/GDP is not significant. 
Similarly, using data from 36 developing countries for the period of 1980-94, Noorbakhsh et 
al. (2001) finds no significant influence on FDI/GDP for two Freedom House indexes, and 
also for their average. Kucera (2002) employs the ratio of FDI inflows to world FDI inflows 
as a dependent variable and finds an insignificant result for political rights and civil liberties. 
In the meanwhile, Resnick (2001), Li and Resnick (2003), and Asiedu and Lien (2011) report 
a negative effect of democracy on FDI. Resnick (2001) examines links between democracy 
and MNEs behavior and find that higher levels of democracy discourage FDI investors. Li 
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and Resnick (2003), using data from 53 developing countries for the period of 1982 to 1995, 
state that democratic institutions reduce FDI inflows. Asiedu and Lien (2010) indicate that 
democracy in rich resource export countries has a negative impact on FDI inflows. They show 
that democracy only enhances FDI if the share of minerals and oil in total exports is less than 
some critical value. 
Another view argues that democracy will have a positive impact on FDI inflows. Democratic 
institutions encourage FDI inflows, since they increase property rights protection and decrease 
risks, as well as transaction costs, for FDI investors. Accordingly, democratic institutions (e.g., 
human rights) lead democracies to obtain larger amounts of FDI inflows (Blanton and Blanton, 
2007). There are several empirical studies which examine the theoretical foundation to explore 
whether MNEs prefer democratic countries for their investments. Addison and Heshmati (2003), 
using an unbalanced dataset of a large sample of countries, finds a positive effect of democracy 
on FDI flows. In addition, Busse (2003) empirically examine the complex relationship between 
democracy and FDI. They illustrate that investments by multinationals are significantly higher 
in democratic countries, thereby refuting the hypothesis that political repression fosters FDI. 
This result confirms the empirical findings by Harms and Ursprung (2002), which suggest 
that MNEs are attracted to invest in countries that protect political rights and civil liberties. 
Blanton and Blanton (2007); employing a time-series cross-sectional data over the time period 
of 1980 – 2003, focus on non-OECD countries. They suggest a positive relationship between 
FDI and human rights. Two years later, Blanton and Blanton (2009) use an OLS regression to 
analyze U.S. FDI panel data of ten sectors over 1990–2004. Their results suggest that human 
rights determine FDI, especially in sectors that employ highly skilled workers. 
Furthermore, a number of recent papers investigate the influence of democracy on FDI 
flows using sectoral FDI data. Kucera and Principi (2014) evaluate the U.S. FDI for 54 countries. 
They find a greater positive influence for service sectors, rather than manufacturing industries. 
Complementing this, Hecock and Jepsen (2014) confirm that using non-aggregated data will 
alter the results. Using data across 15 Latin American countries from 1986 to 2006, they find 
substantial variation in the causes and characteristics of FDI across sectors. Moreover, Hecock 
and Jepsen (2014) confirm the results in Kucera and Principi (2014); they show that the positive 
effect of democracy on FDI is greater for service sectors than manufacturing industries.
Simultaneous Impact of Economic Freedom and Democracy on FDI inflows
The link between the two freedoms (i.e., economic Freedom and democracy) and its impact on 
the economy have long been proposed. Friedman (1962) suggests that free markets and political 
freedom are inseparable. “It is widely believed that politics and economics are separate and 
largely unconnected; that individual freedom is a political problem and material welfare is an 
economic problem.” He called such beliefs “a delusion.” Hence, he promotes economic freedom 
as both an essential freedom in itself and a very important means for political freedom (pp. 
7–10). He argues that the relationship between democracy and economic freedom is complex 
and by no means unilateral. 
The idea of inspiration between economic freedom and democracy has been tested by Wu 
and Davis (1999), who investigate the relationships among the two freedoms, economic growth, 
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and development. They find a fundamental effect of economic freedom in fostering economic 
growth and a high level of income as the condition of a high degree of political freedom. 
Recently, Sambharya and Rasheed (2015), using a sample of 95 countries for the 1995-2000 
time period, suggest that economic freedom and political freedom lead to higher FDI inflows. 
Based on this research which investigates the impacts of these two factors separately, they 
suggest less intervention by governments so they can absorb more FDI inflows. 
As is recognized in the literature, the results of an investigation on the impact of democracy 
and FDI are mixed. To find a solution, Mathur and Singh (2013) focus on the intermediate 
role of economic freedom and corruption perceptions. Their results may help answer the 
question of why countries that rank poorly on the democracy index, like China and Singapore, 
are successful in attracting FDI inflows. They indicate that countries with a higher level of 
democracy may attract less FDI inflows if economic freedoms are not guaranteed. Moreover, 
less corrupt countries have a better chance of receiving more FDI inflows. These results are 
in line with the hypothesis in this study. However, it is now apparent that the literature has 
mainly tested the impacts of economic freedom and democracy on FDI inflows independently. 
Consequently, this study intends to fill this gap in the literature.
METHODOLOGY
Model Specification
This study follows a model proposed by Cheng and Kwan (2000) which expresses the current 
value of FDI as a function of past FDI. The reason for the inclusion of past FDI and explanatory 
variable is because MNCs decision to invest in a particular country depends on the success 
of past investment, which is indicated by the stock of past FDI in the country. Moreover, it is 
assumed that FDI by MNEs will take time to reach its desired level (Kinoshita and Campos, 
2003). Therefore, the adjustment process for FDI is assumed to follow the following form:
ΔFDIi,t = θ(FDI*i,t - FDIi,t-1) (1)
where ΔFDIi,t = FDIi,t - FDIi,t-1 and FDI*i,t is the steady-state level of the FDI stock. By 
rearranging the above equations, we obtain:
FDIi,t = ( 1 - θ) FDIi,t-1 + θ FDI*i,t  (2)
where θ must be less than one for stability. The literature suggests several other factors that 
may affect the volume of FDI inflows. Here the factors of economic freedom and democracy 
are added in equation (3) as factors that may affect the volume of FDI inflows. With this 
information, by rearranging the equation (2) the equation (3) can be extended as follow:
FDI*i,t = λDEMi,t + γ EFi,t + δ Xi,t + µi,t (3)
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where  DEMi,t denotes the index of democracy, λ is its coefficient, EFi,t symbolizes the economic 
freedom, γ is its coefficient, Xi,t represents the vector of control variables, and µi,t denotes the 
error term. With these changes, equation (3) can be expressed as follows: 
FDI*i,t =  λDEMi,t + γ EFi,t + ρEFi,t × DEMi,t  + δ Xi,t + µi,t (4)
To test the simultaneous effect of economic freedom and democracy on FDI, an interaction 
term constructed as EFi,t × DEMi,t is added to the model. Substituting equation (4) into (2) 
yields the following equation:
FDIi,t = α +β FDIi,t-1+ λDEMi,t + γ EFi,t + ρ(EFi,t x DEMi,t) + δ Xi,t + Ԑi + ѵi,t (5)
where α stands for a vector of parameters, and β denotes the coefficient of lag dependent 
variable.
Dynamic Panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
The pooled OLS estimation is a simple and suitable methodology for static cross-sectional 
data analysis. However, this method creates two major weaknesses. Firstly, it fails to control 
the unobserved country-specific (fixed) effects. Secondly, it fails to account for the potential 
endogeneity problem. It is assumed that in equation (5) the µi,t term has two orthogonal 
components: the fixed effects Ԑi , and idiosyncratic shocks ѵi,t .Therefore, the disturbance follows 
an error component model as µi,t = Ԑi + ѵi,t where Ԑi ~ IID (0, σε2) denotes the unobserved 
country-specific effect, and ѵi ~ IID (0, σѵ2) is the error term. Since FDIi,t is a function of Ԑi , it 
follows that FDIi,t-1 is also a function of Ԑi. Therefore, FDIi,t-1 is correlated with the error term. 
This makes the OLS estimator biased and inconsistent even if the ѵit is not serially correlated. 
The method of fixed effects is designed to control the unobserved country-specific time-invariant 
effects in the data. However, using the method of fixed effects, one of the issues is that the 
approach does not address the problem of endogeneity either, and without time dummies it 
does not control the unobserved common time effects among countries.
The most widely used alternative is dynamic panel estimation technique. In this study, the 
generalized method-of-moments (GMMs) estimator is used to test the simultaneous impact 
of economic freedom and democracy on FDI inflows. This estimator has been used in the 
analysis of finance-growth link (Levine et al., 2000; Beck et al.,2000; Azman-Saini & Smith, 
2011), FDI-growth link (Azman-Saini et al., 2010), R&D spillovers (Chee-Lip et al., 2015), 
among many others. Following Arellano and Bond (1991), equation (6) is transformed into 
first differences to eliminate country-specific effects:
FDIi,t  − FDIi,t-1 = α +β(FDIi,t-1 - FDIi,t-2)  + γ(EFi,t - EFi,t -1) + ρ[(EFi,t × DEMi,t) - (EFi,t-1 
× DEMi,t-1 )] + δ(Xi,t - + Xi,t-1) + (ѵi,t - ѵi,t-1)         (6)
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Alternatively, the equation (6) can be written as follows:
ΔFDIi,t = α +βΔFDIi,t-1+ γΔEFi,t + ρΔ(EFi,t x DEMi,t) + δΔXi,t + Δѵi,t (7)
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggested that lagged level of independent variables are used 
as instruments. Under this analysis, two sets of conditions must be satisfied to ensure the 
validity of the results. First, the standard GMM condition of no second order autocorrelation 
in the error term and secondly, the lag of explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. In other 
words, the unobserved country-specific effect is not correlated with their differences even if it is 
correlated with the regressors’ levels, i.e., the deviations of the initial values of the independent 
variables from their long-run values are not systematically related to the country-specific 
effects. Therefore, following Arellano and Bond (1991), the following moment conditions are 
set for equation (7): 
E[FDIi,t-s ∙ (ѵi,t - ѵi,t-1)]  = 0 for s ≥ 2; t = 3, ..., T  (8)
E[Zi,t-s ∙ (ѵi,t - ѵi,t-1)]  = 0  for s ≥ 2; t = 3, ..., T  (9)
where Z is vector of dependent variables. In addition, Arellano-Bover (1995), Ahn and 
Schmidt (1995, 1997), and Blundell-Bond (1998)augments Arellano-Bond (1991) by making 
an additional assumption, that first differences of instrument variables are uncorrelated with 
the fixed effects. Accordingly, they construct a system of two equations, the original equation, 
as well as the transformed one, and it is known as system GMM. Based on this, equations (8) 
and (9) could be changed as follows:
E[FDIi,t-s − FDIi,t-s-1 ∙ (ɛi + ѵit)]  = 0 for s = 2; t = 3, ..., T (10)
E[Zi,t-s − Zi,t-s-1 ∙ (ɛi + ѵit)]  = 0  for s ≥ 2; t = 3, ..., T (11)
By exploiting more moment conditions, the system GMM estimator can dramatically 
improve efficiency compared to the difference GMM estimator. Moreover, the system GMM 
is preferred to difference GMM since finite sample bias problems caused by weak instruments 
in first differenced GMM will be addressed by using system GMM. It also offers forward 
orthogonal deviations, an alternative to differencing that preserves sample size in panels with 
gaps. In addition, Alonso-Borrego & Arellano (1999) and Blundell & Bond (1998) show 
that when the explanatory variables are persistent, such as variable of economic freedom in 
our study, the lagged levels of the variables become weak instruments. They show that weak 
instruments may lead to biased parameter estimates in small samples and larger variance 
asymptotically. 
The GMM estimators, both difference and system estimators can be applied in two ways, 
namely one and two-step (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The one-step estimators use weighting 
matrices that are independent of estimated parameters. In the presence of heteroskedasticity 
and serial correlation, the two-step estimator uses a consistent estimate of the weighting matrix, 
taking the residuals from the one-step estimate. Although the two-step GMM is asymptotically 
more efficient, it produces estimates of standard errors that tend to be downward biased. 
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However, this problem can be solved using the finite-sample two-step covariance matrix 
correction procedure proposed by Windmeijer (2005). This adjustment gives more efficient 
GMM estimates, especially for system GMM (Roodman, 2009). 
Here two tests of Hansen/Sargan and AR (2) test must be considered. To test model 
specification validity, the Hansen/Sargan tests for over identification evaluate the entire set of 
over identifying restrictions. This test examines the lack of correlation between the instruments 
and the error term. Moreover, the AR (1) and AR (2) statistics measure first and second-degree 
serial correlations. The AR (2) test examines the hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation 
in the error term of the difference Equation (3.30).Failure to reject the null of both tests provides 
support to the estimated model (Arellano and Bond, 1991).
Data Description
This study uses a sample which consists of 87 countries over the period of 1981-2010. The 
data is divided into six non-overlapping five-year periods. The variables are either categorized 
as stock and flow variables. Stock variables are measured at the beginning of each five-year 
period and flow variables are measured as averages over the five-year period. Stock variables 
consist of population, human capital, democracy, and economic freedom. Flow variables 
consist of GDP, FDI inflows, domestic investment, and openness. All data are transformed 
into logarithmic form prior to the analysis.
The key variable FDI measured by the ratio of net foreign direct investment inflows to 
GDP, is taken from the World Development Indicator database. Other data on population, and 
life expectancy (i.e., a proxy for human capital), and the indicator of telephone lines per 100 
people (a proxy for infrastructure) are also obtained from the World Development Indicator 
database. Additionally, data on GDP (i.e., measured by Real GDP at constant 2005 national 
prices (in mil. 2005US$)), domestic investment (i.e., measured by capital stock at current PPPs 
(in mil. 2005US$)), and openness (i.e., measured by Openness in Current Prices) are obtained 
from the Penn World Table database (version 8.0). 
Data for democracy is collected from the Freedom House (2012) which provides both 
reports and numerical ratings for 192 countries. Each country is assigned a numerical rating 
and the total number of points awarded to the political rights and civil liberties checklists 
determines the political rights and civil liberties ratings. Each point total corresponds to a 
rating of one through seven, with one representing the highest and seven the lowest level of 
freedom. The ratings process is based on a checklist of 10 political rights questions (grouped 
into three subcategories) and 15 civil liberties questions (grouped into four subcategories). 
In this study, rating of the political rights is used to measure democracy. The original ranking 
from one to seven (with 1 representing the most score and 7 the least score) has been converted 
here to a scale from zero to one, where zero corresponds to the fewest political rights and one 
to the most political rights.
The index by the Fraser Institute is employed to measure the economic freedom. The 
index is developed based on three key notions: individual choice and voluntary transaction, 
free competition, personal and property protection. The index has five underlying components, 
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namely government intervention, legal structure and security of property rights, access to sound 
money, freedom to trade with foreigners and regulation of credit, labour and business. The 
index is scaled from 0 to 10 with 10 representing the highest level of freedom. 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The first step of the analysis is to examine the influence of economic freedom on FDI inflows. 
As explained before, the difference-GMM estimator can be poorly behaved when the series are 
persistent, which is common in a short panel like our study. Therefore, the logical step to take 
is to utilize the two-step system-GMM estimator. However, the use of the two-step estimator 
in a small sample may not be optimal and the efficiency gain over the one-step estimator 
in hypothesis testing. Windmeijer (2005) suggests a procedure that improves the two-step 
estimator that makes correction to the variance-covariance matrix. Therefore, this study uses 
this methodological procedure and report result based on the two-step system GMM estimator
As shown in table 1, the results show that the coefficient of the main variable (i.e. economic 
freedom) is positive and significant. Specifically, the result shows that improvement in index 
of economic freedom by 1% will increase FDI inflows by 0.26%. This finding is consistent 
with the findings by Quazi (2007), Bengoa-Sanchez (2003), and Azman-Saini et al. (2013).
They find that economic freedom is an important factor to attract FDI inflows by Asian and 
Latin American countries. In addition, the coefficients on market size, return on investment 
and human capital are positive and significant. However, the finding for democracy shows that 
democracy has negative impact on FDI. 
Table 1: FDI and Economic Freedom
Coeff. S.e.# p-value
Lag FDIit-1 0.52 0.14 0.00
Market Size 0.13 0.04 0.00
Openness 0.00 0.00 0.12
Return on Investment 0.13 0.04 0.00
Infrastructure 0.00 0.01 0.76
Human capital 0.05 0.03 0.07
Economic freedom 0.26 0.14 0.06
Democracy -0.03 0.01 0.01
Observation 435
Instruments 18
Arellano-Bond test AR(2) test (p-value) 0.44
Hansen test (p-value) 0.61
Notes:  S.e. is robust standard error. # indicates standard errors corrected for finite 
samples following Windmeijer (2005).All variables are in logarithm form. The variable 
of FDI is the log of (1 + averages over the five-year period). Moreover, the variable 
of Democracy is the log of (1 + beginning of each five-year period). In addition, the 
original ranking from 0 to 7 has been converted here to a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 
corresponds to the zero political rights and 1 to the most political rights.
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The above result is consistent with other scholars such as Oneal (1994), Jessup (1999), 
Emmert and Tuman (2004) ,and Arslan and Ökten (2010) who find negative impact of 
democracy on FDI. They claim that democracy might influence negatively on FDI inflows 
because non-democratic government may provide labors at lower cost.Moreover, Jessup (1999) 
believes that MNEs choose autocratic regimes because of less executive constraint. Moreover, 
the results indicate that the coefficients on openness and infrastructure are not significant at the 
usual level. More importantly, the p-values of second serial correlation (i.e. AR (2)) and Hansen 
over-identification tests are big enough to conclude that the models are correctly specified and 
the instruments are valid.
The next step of the analysis is to evaluate the simultaneous influence of economic freedom 
and democracy on FDI inflows. To test the objective, the interaction specification is used which 
include an interaction term constructed as a product of economic freedom and democracy index 
is added to the baseline model. However, it should be noted that the inclusion of an interaction 
term may induce multicollinearity problem as the interaction term tends to be strongly correlated 
with the variables used to construct them (Darlington, 1990). Following two-step procedure 
is employed to remedy this problem: First, the interaction term is regressed on the variables 
of economic freedom and democracy. Second, the residuals generated from the regression in 
first step are used instead of the interaction term in our estimation (Burill, 2007). The result 
of estimating interaction specification is reported in table 2. The p-values of second serial 
correlation (i.e. AR (2)) and Hansen over-identification tests are 0.44 and 0.61 respectively. 
Accordingly, the null hypothesis is not rejected meaning that the models are correctly specified 
and the instruments are valid. 
The main finding shows that the coefficient on the main variable (i.e. economic freedom) is 
positive and statistically significant at the level of 10%. However, the coefficient on democracy 
and also the interaction term EF x DEM is not significant at the usual level which suggests 
that the democracy has no significant effect on the FDI inflows. In addition, the coefficients on 
market size, return on investment, and human capital are positive and significant. Furthermore, 
the results indicate that openness and infrastructure do not affect FDI inflows. 
Table 2: Simultaneous impact of EF and DEM on FDI inflows
Coeff. S.e.# p-value
FDIit-1 0.51 0.15 0.00
Market Size 0.14 0.04 0.00
Openness 0.00 0.00 0.20
Return on Investment 0.14 0.04 0.00
Infrastructure 0.00 0.01 0.75
Human capital 0.05 0.03 0.14
Economic freedom (EF) 0.26 0.13 0.06
Democracy (DEM) -0.02 0.02 0.39
Interaction of EF x DEM  -0.01 0.03 0.64
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Observation 435
Instruments 18
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.44
Hansen test (p-value) 0.61
As a robustness check, the possible effect of outlier observations on the estimation results 
is assessed. The outliers are detected using Cook’s distance measure which is one of the most 
effective techniques specially when combined with graphic diagnostics like squared residuals 
versus Leverages plot (Blatná 2006). Cook's distance measure is a common statistical test that 
indicates the impact of an observation on the estimated regression coefficient. According to 
this procedure, the higher the Cook's distance value is, the more influential the corresponding 
point on the estimated regression. This study takes the conservative approach of using 4/N as 
a cut-off point following Bollenand Jackman (1990) and Blatná (2006), where N is the number 
of observations. The test results suggest that 16 countries are potential outliers which include 
Barbados, Benin, Chile, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Finland, India, Israel, Kenya, Malawi, 
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sweden, Syria, and Zambia. The following figure, show a scatter plot 
of squared residual versus leverages. The observations with high combination of leverage and 
residual are influential points. 
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Figure 1: Identification of outliers, FDI determinants Insert figure 1 here
Table 3 presents a new result that excludes outliers. As shown in the table, the exclusions 
of outliers did not alter the results significantly. The new result suggests that coefficient on 
economic freedom is significant and the one on the interaction term remains insignificant. The 
Table 2 (Cont.)
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p-values of second serial correlation (i.e. AR (2)) and Hansen over-identification tests are 0.88 
and 0.26 respectively. They are big enough to conclude that the models are correctly specified 
and the instruments are valid. The overall findings suggest that there is no evidence to support 
that simultaneous occurrence of economic freedom and democracy is important in attracting 
FDI inflows. This finding is not consistent with Friedman’s prediction that that free markets 
and political freedom are inseparable. 
Table 3: FDI Determinants without Outliers
Coeff. S.e.# p-value
FDIit-1 0.56 0.18 0.00
Market Size 0.12 0.05 0.03
Openness 0.00 0.00 0.21
Return on Investment 0.12 0.05 0.03
Infrastructure -0.01 0.01 0.38
Human capital 0.03 0.02 0.11
Economic freedom (EF) 0.28 0.17 0.09
Democracy (DEM) -0.03 0.02 0.30
EF x DEM  0.00 0.03 0.93
Observation 360
Instruments 18
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.88
Hansen test (p-value) 0.26
CONCLUSION
This study investigates the simultaneous role of economic freedom and democracy in attracting 
FDI inflows. To investigate the simultaneous influence of democracy and economic freedom on 
FDI inflows, the interaction specification is employed. Using a dynamic GMM panel estimator, 
this study uses a sample which consists of 87 countries over the period of 1981-2010. This 
study’s primary finding illustrates that the impact of economic freedom on FDI inflows is 
positive and significant. However, the results suggest that the democracy (i.e. political freedom) 
has no significant effect on FDI inflows. More importantly, the findings indicate that there is 
no evidence to support our hypothesis that simultaneous improvements of economic freedom 
and democracy are required to attract MNEs. Instead, the results suggest that improvement in 
economic freedom alone is sufficient to attract more FDI inflows. This finding is not consistent 
with Friedman’s prediction that free markets and political freedom are inseparable. Hence, 
MNEs may only respond to improvements in the freedom of economic activities, not the level 
of democracy. There are many countries which experienced a good score of economic freedom 
but they are not democratic. The countries such as Bahrain, Qatar, Armenia, and United Arab 
Emirates are ranked among first 50 countries in economic freedom index; however, they are 
rated as non-democratic countries. These economies have succeeded to receive a significant 
amount of investments from MNEs. Accordingly, some non-governmental organizations 
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(NGOs) such as Amnesty International consider FDI as a tool of exploitation. The MNEs 
are blamed for contributing to the conditions that lead to human rights conflict. Therefore, 
the MNEs are reminded that they have a responsibility to contribute to the promotion and 
protection of human rights and democracy. The MNEs have been advised to promote greater 
social responsibility in their operations and improvement of democratic institutions.
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